The Iran War: What are Trump’s Options and How Bad Could It Get ?

 

Donald Trump has a problem on his hands…and the USA as a nation now has an even bigger one....

Having been persuaded by Netanyahu, and his own White House advisors, that an all-out attack on the Iranian regime and its military wing, the IRGC, was the best solution to the ‘Iranian problem’, Trump was clearly expecting the war to be over in a matter of days. This still seems to be his 'default' position for any campaign he starts, despite the lessons already provided by the Ukraine war and the continued attacks by all 3 of the Iranian proxies in the face of the massive bombing campaigns meted out to all 3 since the October 7th HAMAS attack. All this does beg the question of how closely he is really being kept informed, and who is actually driving US foreign policy...

Despite the intense battering his military and the Israelis have administered over a wide area of Iran in the last 5 weeks, and the cumulative and continuing decapitation of the old leadership in targeted Israeli raids, the Iranian military in the form of the IRGC are still managing to bombard their arab neighbours and Israel with their remaining stock of missiles and drones. More importantly for the West generally, they have effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz to all but a handful of shipping, from whom they are extracting 'tolls' into the $millions for each passage they permit. (This effectively amounts to piracy on the high seas, and is in itself against international law.)

By doing this, they have blocked supplies of oil and gas from the middle east oilfields to the rest of the world. This, in turn, has already triggered large hikes in the prices of oil and gas worldwide and threatens serious economic disruption if the situation persists for more than a couple more weeks. It has already led to fuel rationing in some SE asian states who have been wholly-dependent on middle east oil and gas.

It’s obvious from their immediate response, and early strategy of attacking their immediate arab neighbours, that the IRGC have been preparing for this eventuality for some time, and had planned to 'hold the world economy to ransom' in this way from the start as soon as  they were attacked. They will have known that their policy of ‘disruption by proxy‘ over the past decade would eventually backfire in the face of Israel’s growing strength and its continued US support under Trump. They will also have been well aware that this would eventually bring military retribution from the skies on their home territory. The 12-day war of 2025 will have given them advanced warning that this was nigh, and they then set the ball rolling on building up munitions and underground storage as quickly as possible thereafter to resist the inevitable bombing campaign when it came.

Their ability to spirit away their stocks of enriched uranium just before the US had a chance to bomb it out of existence during last year’s 12 day war should perhaps also have given us a clue to their ability to outfox a superior enemy (superior in terms of firepower at least). A more enlightened US administration might have taken the opportunity to nip this in the bud by targeted follow-up strikes on their military infrastructure last summer, however Trump mistakenly assumed that the regime had learned its lesson and would accept that it would never be allowed to develop a nuclear capability. This was a major misjudgement on the part of his advisors, and shows a lack of understanding, both of the Iranian mindset, and the true situation on the ground.

In common with past successful terrorist organisations under attack by a militarily superior enemy, the IRGC have adopted a cleverly thought out strategy of regional disruption, and hidden away much of their armament underground and away from the US bombers and missiles to enable them to continue their reprisal attacks.  They have also spread their command structure downwards and adopted a redundancy strategy to allow fast and effective replacement of top-level victims of Israeli assassination within the leadership, both within and outside the IRGC organisation.  Thus the recent announcement by the Israelis of the demise of top security official Ali Larijani and Basij commander Gholamreza Soleimani in the latest bombing raid may make little impression on IRGC policy. It will have also gained them 'sympathy support' amongst the large sections of the population which still support the regime. The new Ayatollah has not been seen in public since the Feb 28th raid when it appears he was badly wounded, and he may either be still comatose or even actually dead. His appointment was a propaganda exercise, largely designed to present a defiant posture to the outside world by keeping the ruling Khamenei 'dynasty' alive. It also provided a figurehead and rallying point for internal regime support. If 'Khamenei Mark 3' dies, and the regime are forced by media exposure to acknowledge the death, they (or more likely the IRGC), will simply appoint someone else for the Israelis to take pot shots at.

This type of disseminated command structure does also present a problem for any negotiations between the US and Iran - i.e. finding out who is actually in charge. There is much publicity at present about 'how well' negotiations are going - the fact that the Iranian hierarchy deny all knowledge of any such negotiations suggests they may lack any real validity. There is another possible reason for this public denial by Iran, however, as we'll discuss shortly. What we can say is that any agreement may be difficult for the regime to implement if IRGC decide to veto part, or indeed all, of it.

What is actually happening on the ground inside Iran ? Being fearful of reprisals from their civilian dissenters if the regime does ever fall, the Basij force (effectively an internal offshoot of the IRGC responsible for policing) have adopted a ruthless ‘shoot on sight’ approach to any civilian opposition that might emerge. They demonstrated the effectiveness of  this policy earlier this year, killing 60,000+ unarmed civilians in the process of quelling the January street demonstrations. 

This has effectively enabled them and their regime to survive the initial allied onslaught and retain enough military capacity to continue their guerrilla campaign. It has also ensured that no similar demonstrations will occur while they remain at large. Although they have been targeted extensively from the air, we can be confident that, as fanatics and islamic jihadists sworn to 'defend the faith' (or at least their warped interpretation of its doctrines), the Basij, and their IRGC counterparts, will be prepared to fight to the death, and will be allowed to by the regime to eliminate any dissenters with impunity. 

The denial of any participation by the 'official' Iranian regime that they were actually participating in any discussions with the US until the recent Islamabad  'peace talks' were announced  speaks volumes - they realise that they are totally dependent on the good offices of the IRGC and fear that any dealings with the 'Great Satan' would spell disaster for them at the hands of their own military. Thus we are unlikely to see an internal solution which in any way threatens to weaken the IRGC's structure and power.

We can perhaps liken the remedy that will be needed to curtail the IRGC's influence, and re-integrate Iran into the world order, to removal of an embedded and aggressive malignant tumour from a healthy organ - the surgical excision itself causes significant damage to the surrounding tissue, and you can never be sure whether you've removed it all, and if not, whether it will re-establish itself and then possibly also metastasise to other, hitherto healthy, areas. Speed is of the essence, given the rapid progress of the tumour and follow-up therapy and post-op screening is essential to detect any recurrence.

In this case, the excision process is likely to be militarily difficult, and probably won't be achievable without 'boots on the ground' in some form, and therefore substantial casualties on both sides. The exception to this would be if nucear weapons become involved, in which case the wholesale destruction and residual radioactivity would make it difficult for any organised military effort to continue. 

It's no coincidence that large numbers of elite US troops are now on station in the Gulf now, and are starting to clear the strait of mines. Trump, however, will be well aware that significant US troop losses before November would severely affect his party's showing in this year's mid-terms, given his promise on election of "no more evermore foreign wars", and so will avoid US land force participation in mainland Iran unless absolutely necessary, and is under pressure to resolve things before then. He will be heaving a sigh of relief at the recovery of both downed aircrew recently - a captive US POW would have given the IRGC a powerful bargaining chip in any future negotiations.

To continue the medical analogy, we may need to accept that the tumour may be inoperable in this case, and find alternative ways of suppressing its growth in order to save the patient's life. Not always easy or even possible for the more aggressive malignancies...especially those that have already metastasised, as this one has already - to Lebanon, Gaza and Yemen. It's no coincidence that Hizbollah stepped up their attacks on Israel after March 8th - this will have been at the express request of Tehran and was engineered to divert some of the bombing resource away from the 'parent' organisation. The Houthis have now 'weighed in' again, this time with a couple of ineffectual missile attempts at Israel, but with the threat of resuming attacks on Red Sea shipping. More about their prospects for survival later...

The IRGC regime's hope now will be that the growing opposition to Trump's war at home, in Europe and the rest of the world, and particularly in the arab world, will force him to bring the campaign to an end while still allowing them to stay in power. They will continue to refuse any further diplomatic efforts towards a solution unless and until their demands are met and will be determined to retain a stranglehold on oil and gas shipments ‘as long as it takes’. As far as they are concerned, mere survival of the regime constitutes 'victory', whatever the damage done to their country's population and infrastructure. Their recent successful downing of 2 US planes, and the manhunt for the pilot of one of them will only serve to reinforce their determination to fight the 'Great Satan' and his collaborators to the last.

As we'll see later, though, continuing with this belligerent approach could be a very dangerous strategy for the Iranian regime....and for their country as a whole.

Is there an easy 'off ramp' solution to Trump’s latest 'folly' ? In a word, no…yesterdays abject failure of the Islamabad peace talks (Round 1) would tend to confirm the gulf between the 2 sides is unbridgeable.

Let’s consider a few possible scenarios as to how things might resolve.

1)      The War Continues: All attempts at early negotiation fail, and the bombing campaign resumes unabated. Trump carries out his threat to degrade power infrastructure, with reprisals on Gulf state neighbours and Israel by IRGC. Attempts are also made to provide naval ‘cover’ for shipping to pass the Strait of Hormuz safely, but the Strait remains effectively blocked due to shipping insurance issues. The US may also attempt to put 'boots on the ground' locally on Iranian or disputed islands in an attempt to control the straits and Iran's ability to export its own oil. An attack on the Kharg island terminal is one of the more likely options - Trump claims he has already destroyed IRGC military assets there in preparation for an assault. Given the difficulty of holding territory in the face of Iranian artillery, some believe the publicity given to it by the White House may be a feint, with the intent being simply to destroy the facility, thereby cutting off any oil revenues for Iran for the foreseeable future. A blockade of the Strait to Iranian tankers further down the gulf might also be an option, but a more dangerous one for the naval forces and shipping involved because of the threat from Iranian mines and drones for which they would be 'sitting targets'. Aircraft carriers (toy ones or otherwise!) are expensive beasts and one well-placed drone or missile could do a lot of damage or even sink one of them. Trump would also need to take control of the area immediately adjacent to the Strait on the Iranian side to prevent on-the-fly mine-laying and fast speedboat attacks by IRGC - not an easy task given the existing 'dug-in' status of the Iranian forces.

The main problem with this scenario, apart from the likely unacceptable cost in US casualties and naval resource is the long drawn-out nature of the campaign, already at 6 weeks and counting. A lot more Iranian civilians would also die needlessly as ‘collateral damage’ in the continued and widened bombing campaign, however carefully targets were selected. This is because the Iranians have carefully embedded their military and police within civilian areas to deter attacks from the air, and use the resulting carnage to achieve maximum media coverage when mass-civilian casualties inevitably occur via collateral damage. This in turn serves to rally support for the regime internally. 

There is also a question of whose ordnance reserves run out first. Both US and Israel must be running quite low on munitions, and the Iranian ballistic missile stores must be well-nigh empty after 6 weeks of intensive strikes against Israel and their arab neighbours in the run up to the recent cease fire. A US ground invasion could also lead to allied casualties in significant numbers - not something Trump will want to preside over in the run up to November's mid-terms. It's noteworthy that there have been few volunteers from non-US naval assets in answer to Trump's call to 'man the barricades' in the Gulf...much to his annoyance, of course, as shown by his increasingly petulant social media attacks on the UK and other EU NATO members recently.

The damage to Iran's arab neighbours would also continue, continuing to stoke even more resentment locally against the regime, and against US/Israel for stirring up a known hornets’ nest in the first place. The wilful and quite extensive damage already done by Iran to oil and gas infrastructure in the Gulf will make it hard to rebuild bridges with its arab neighbours after the present conflict ends, thus fuelling continued isolation for the regime and potential for more regional strife. Although they will by now be getting quite short of missiles, it's likely that  IRGC still have sufficient stocks of cheap drones to continue causing local damage across the strait for many weeks. They may also be receiving new supplies from the Russians and Chinese 'under the counter' as part of their mutual defence pact, (although the Russians will probably not have many 'spares' to offer, now that Iranian stocks will have been cut off and their reserves depleted by the recent intensive Ukraine winter and spring campaigns - it appears from last month's record launch of nearly 1000 drones that Putin may be 'going for broke' - literally). As a result, the blockade of the Strait would probably continue, with significant damage to naval escorts and vulnerable shipping foolhardy enough to attempt the passage from mines and fast torpedo boats. This would in turn encourage the allies to take things even further militarily, and not necessarily by wholly conventional means. We’ll discuss this rather alarming possibility and its consequences shortly…

2)      Diplomacy and Negotiation Wins Out: In the face of growing opposition from his allies, Trump reconsiders his policy and ‘declares victory’, on the grounds that he has done enough to remove any immediate danger to US interests. He manages to find someone not already dead or dying with sufficient influence in what's left of the regime to negotiate with, and some form of temporary cease-fire is arranged. The regime, or at least what's left of it, is allowed to continue in charge, but with new and hopefully less hard-line leadership, and shipping is allowed to flow freely again through the Strait. The Houthis withdraw their threat to Red Sea shipping and stop targeting Israel.

Although this is of course the preferred scenario, the problem with this is that ‘it takes two to tango’….or in this case three. The Iranian regime has already said that the war will end ‘when they choose’ even if Trump stops the US campaign in its tracks. Now that they have proved they can hold the rest of the world to ransom by blocking the strait, they will sense an advantage to be gained in continuing to exert their control and insisting on a guarantee of a permanent end to hostilities and a full lifting of sanctions. 

Despite this, it is to be hoped that they would see sense if Trump gave them the opportunity to start ‘picking up the pieces’ without full regime change, large scale infrastructure destruction or continued sanctions. But there is no guarantee of this, and Islamabad Round 1 has confirmed how difficult it is likely to be for a lasting peace agreement to be reached. The IRGC in particular might well see anything short of full agreement to 'their' terms as capitulation; they may even fear for their own survival at the hands of a vengeful populace once hostilities officially ceased and reconstruction began under new leadership. IRGC commanders would never agree to reliquishing their weaponry, and can also be expected to seek revenge for all the damage done to their hardware and leadership by the hated Israelis. Since they are effectively a disseminated organisation, with independent command structures in each military region, separate negotiations with each might be necessary before they agreed to capitulate. They would remain as a wild card, likely to restart hositilities whenever they got the opportunity.

Trump himself would also lose face by 'walking away' at this stage on the back of a 'bad deal' which would of course be anathema to a 'master deal maker' such as himself. He could also be accused by his hawks of not finishing the job when he had the chance, particularly if he is forced to accede to Iran's wholly unfavourable terms. Sanctions may be a particular sticking point in the negotiations - if they were fully lifted, you can be sure the regime would resume enriching their existing uranium stocks at the earliest opportunity, and ensure the hardware for doing so was well protected underground this time. They are, after all, past masters at concealment, having led the AEC a merry dance over their enrichment activities for many years. It is also noteworthy that they refused point blank to agree to forego nuclear weapons development or hand over their U238 stocks at Islamabad. The funding from oil sales at elevated prices would be ample to fund further enrichment of their current stocks, and it would be given priority over any civilian reconstruction projects. We could then expect a re-run of the current war in the early '30s, or even earlier if Russia or China provide nuclear help. Whatever the solution, Iran must be contained...preferably in perpetuity, or at least until it can be trusted not to revert to its old ways, which will require regime change.

And then there is Israel. As the principal instigators of this war, having persuaded Trump to attack in the first place to take advantage of a severely weakened Iranian regime, they will not want to stop until the existential threat to them, i.e. the Iranian theocracy, and with it the IRCG, is removed. The danger is that seeing their erstwhile 'protector' walk away might trigger Netanyahu into a much more substantial response, designed to finish things once and for all. We do not know exactly how much nuclear firepower the Israelis hold, but they would certainly be capable of delivering it to any or all major Iranian cities, and willing to do so if the existential threat that Iran poses to them isn't removed - once and for all. They will not want to lose their perceived advantage now. 

And they could easily start WW3 in earnest by doing so....

Last, but not least, we should not forget Iran's 3 prinicipal proxies, two of which are still actively engaged at Iran's behest. Although HAMAS is pretty much out of the picture, Hizbollah is still causing the IDF problems and are essentially an offshoot of the IRGC, so will be fully on board with Iran's desire to eliminate Israel. The Houthis are already threatening action in Yemen. There is no guarantee that either of these proxies would stop, even if their Iranian 'parent' requested it - the Houthis are in any case commanded separately and took a beating last time they interfered with Red Sea shipping over Gaza. They will however by now be running on their own supplies, having lost Iranian material support at the beginning of the war, but may feel they have a debt of their own to settle with Israel and the US in support of HAMAS. The Israelis are determined to render Hizbollah as impotent as HAMAS, and won't stop until their buffer zone in southern Lebanon is established and the rockets stop coming.

3)      The ‘Doomsday’ Scenario: Trump, seeing his failure to make much impression on the current impasse, gets really angry at being thwarted yet again in his attempts to broker a peace deal 'worthy of his Nobel prize', and throws a tantrum by deciding to ‘go nuclear’ himself as the only long-term solution to the Iran problem. Tactical nuclear weapons are used, initially only on selected military targets, in an attempt to terrorise the regime and its military into submission. This fails to quell the regime, but results in many more civilian casualties, and substantial localised releases of radioactivity, with an attendant outcry from the rest of the world. The IRGC remain determined to fight on ‘to the last’ and things then escalate further with higher-yield nuclear devices then targeted on Iranian cities in an attempt to 'finish the job'. If this happened, things could quickly escalate to a much wider strategic nuclear conflict, with the inevitable 'MAD override' we’ve all feared for the last 60 years…

Could this happen ?

Although you might think there are sufficient built-in fail-safes within the US command structure to prevent any of this happening, this is not guaranteed, particularly with the current US administration, which is something of a 'wildcard' as compared with the norm, to say the least. Going nuclear would, after all, be the logical ‘next step’ to defeat a deeply embedded and well-defended rogue regime with a population incapable of displacing it themselves.  And it would not be without precedent - the first and only use of nuclear weapons - on Japan at the end of WW2 - was widely accepted as being justified at the time in terms of saving US lives by forcing a similar regime, obsessed with fighting to the death, to surrender in the face of overwhelming odds. Why should Trump not just use the same reasoning now to justify a similar attack on Iran? In a rather worrying speech recently, JD Vance hinted at possible nuclear involvment by stating that "...there a plenty more items in our military toolbox we haven't yet used in this conflict..." The obvious question that follows from that is: "Which lunatic is actually running the asylum ?"

What about the practicalities ? We should also remember that tactical nuclear weapons come in many different sizes and types, generally with much lower yields than the strategic variety, and these are designed to inflict maximum damage to enemy troops without causing significant damage to any friendly forces in the vicinity. Trump and his military advisers might therefore believe that they could be used against a non-nuclear power, incapable of replying 'in kind', with impunity, and could do so without triggering a full scale strategic exchange with either Russia or China, or indeed spreading large quantities of radioactive dust round the planet. 

However, modern tactical nuclear warheads have yields in the tens of kilotons, some potentially hundreds, i.e. several times that of the weapons used in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The damage this would inflict on Iran's cities and their populations, even if the warheads were accurately targeted in an attempt to eradicate embedded military infrastructure, would be colossal, and render them uninhabitable for centuries. The residual radioactivity alone would be likely to kill thousands - of the 160,000 killed in the Hiroshima bombing, barely half of these died on day 1. We know from Chernobyl and Fukushima that even relatively small accidental releases of log-lived high-energy isotopes can cause significant disruption to civilian life in distant parts of the globe. The refugee exodus of those not killed in the first nuclear raids would swamp Iran's immediate neighbours, and the ripples from this event alone would spread throughout Europe and the middle east.

So-called 'Neutron' weapons, designed to maximise radiation dose over blast damage locally, could be used in an attempt to frighten the IRGC into submission, but would likely also result in widespread collateral civilian deaths. Thus any form of nuclear attack by the US would be extremely dangerous in this context, and likely to escalate quickly into strategic nuclear exchanges with the 'eastern axis'. Even if this did not happen, it would give Putin, who has already gone on the record as threatening to use tactical weapons against Ukraine, a cast-iron excuse to actually start doing so.

The recent re-entry of the Houthis into the conflict may also give cause for concern in this context. Any missile attacks they can manage to inflict on Israel are unlikely to do much damage at that range, but any renewal of their threat to Red Sea shipping will undoubtedly attract further punishment. Although their military infrastructure took some hard knocks in last year's bombing campaign, Iran will have been restocking their weaponry in the interim. Trump may also persuade the Saudis to resume their bombing campaign against Yemen in support of the official elected government. Although most shipping has now been diverted away from Suez and round the Cape, the route will be needed while Hormuz is closed, and Trump may see this as a good opportunity to introduce tactical nuclear into the middle east theatre 'at arms length' as a test case 'pour encourager les autres'. A punitive nuclear strike on Sanaa would alert Iran and its allies to the risks of devastation they face, and do so far enough away from major centres of population in Europe and the middle east to avoid radioactive contamination. Yemen is the only proxy where this would be feasible - both HAMAS and Hizbollah are too close to Israeli territory to be 'safe' nuclear targets.

Another possibility of applying more devastating weaponry, but not involving the release of ionising radiation, would be to use Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons - these generate an intense burst of radio frequency energy and if powerful enough, will literally 'fry' any electronic circuits in the vicinity. The US CHAMP missile and HiJenks system are already available to the US and could be used to destroy local power grids and military hardware dependent on electronic circuitry (i.e. most modern weapons). These weapons could be effective even if the target was concealed from view, and without the collateral death toll associated with carpet bombing or tactical/strategic nuclear. More importantly perhaps, they are known to be effective at disabling drones, which are used extensively by the Iranians and their proxies, and also supplied to Putin's forces for use in Ukraine.

So far we've looked only at the possibility of the US using its nuclear capability to bring the war to a conclusion. We should not forget that Iran is likely to have retained a significant stockpile of enriched uranium. They were estimated to have enriched ca 450kg up to 60% before the June '25 bombing raids - enough for 10 sizeable nuclear devices if enriched a little further, which might have been achieved within a few months using underground facilities not damaged in 2025. We also know from recent missile attacks on Israel that they still have the long-range delivery systems to deliver sizeable warheads, some of which were earmarked for a future space programme. This was what really 'spooked' the Israelis into pressuring Trump into starting the present round of attacks in the first place. One of these was used in the Diego Garcia base attack attempt, mainly as a show of strength, but this 'evidence of capability' could yet backfire severely on the regime by encouraging 'terminal' nuclear strikes.

It's widely believed that the IRGC managed to spirit away at least some of this U238 stockpile before the 12-day war. It must by now be obvious to them that their nuclear programme is in tatters, for now at least, and couldn't be reactivated soon enough to present a credible threat of a nuclear device during the current conflict. If they perceive themselves to be in real danger of eradication, they may decide to deliver their Israeli friends one final 'special present' in the form of a 'dirty' bomb i.e. one designed specifically to disseminate radioactivity over as wide an area as possible.

Even if they only managed to salvage 25% of their 60% stock last June, this would provide ca 100 kg of 60% enriched Uranium 238 - more than enough to cause havoc if delivered to central Tel Aviv. Provided the missile(s) were directed accurately (and there would likely be more than one involved, to maximise the chances of success), Israel's 'iron dome' would not be an effective protection - if anything, shooting the offending missiles down shortly before ground detonation would disseminate the radioactive cargo more effectively and over a wider area. If this actually happened, Netanyahu would have a prime excuse to 'wheel out the strategic nukes' in earnest against Tehran and all hell would break loose. Alternatively they could try closer to home where air defences are less efficient by picking one of their arab neighbours (Dubai or Doha would probably be the prime targets). I doubt whether even the IRGC would be foolhardy enough to risk this, as 'all hell' really would rain down on Tehran if they tried it. 

Food for thought, perhaps, at least while Iran continues to have a credible long-range ballistic missile capability and sufficient enriched Uranium.

There is also the question of national pride to consider - in the face of Trump's recent threat to obliterate their power infrastructure, their response was simply to threaten to destroy their neighbours' oil and gas terminals - clear evidence of suicidal economic tendencies and the determination to fight 'to the last'...

But how likely that Trump will go for some form of doomsday scenario in practice ?

Hopefully, not all that likely, given the outcry that would follow....and the potential for escalation to WW3.

However, we should remember when considering this that the US system does allow its president sweeping powers as the commander in chief, especially in wartime scenarios. This would include the right to override any attempt at impeachment by congress (now still Republican-controlled anyway, but likely to go Democrat after this year’s mid-terms). The same powers could also be used to secure Trump a 3^rd term, or even postpone the 2028 election indefinitely. 

Neither could we expect his acolytes to remove him - Trump’s leadership team are effectively toothless when it comes to dealing with his whims, and appear to be still in ‘emperor’s new clothes’ mode when it comes to offering any form of criticism. There is also some doubt whether he is being kept fully informed of the true situation - his advisors will likely feel under an obligation to tell him what he wants to hear, rather than what he needs to hear. The hawks in his military team might also be able to convince the rest of them that use of nuclear capability could be kept confined to tactical nuclear weapons. Thus we shouldn't necessarily expect the US political system to prevent the unthinkable actually happening...at least not with the current administration !

The other factor to consider is that ‘The Donald’ himself, now fast approaching his eighties, has been showing increasing signs of mental instability since the start of his 2^nd term, and certainly cannot any longer be relied upon to offer consistently sound judgement (it's arguable as to whether he ever was!). He is frequently lampooned in the press as ‘having the mentality of a particularly tantrum-prone 3-year old’ – while this assessment is probably a little simplistic, his behaviour certainly does make one wonder about his sanity at times.  His 1^st term strategy of ‘keep ‘em all guessing’ has worn decidedly thin now as an explanation of his behavioural volatility, and most pundits accept that his behaviour is just too erratic for it all to have been pre-planned so as to confuse the opposition. His decision to run for office with Vance certainly was a master stroke, though, in protecting him from assassination - if he dies in office we get Vance as POTUS.

Thus we would be unwise to discount the possibility of something resembling scenario 3.  We should all pray to whatever deity we subscribe to that we can survive until January 2029 (or indeed beyond!) without this, or any other Trump/Vance-induced 'armageddon', arising. The Iranian regime (or what's left of it this morning!), would do well to consider the danger they are risking for themselves and their country, if they cause Trump to really 'flip' and he decides to 'let them have it'.....their obstinate refusal to reopen Hormuz could be the beginning of the end - and for the middle east as a whole and not just Iran.

As an aside, it's ironic, and I think quite revealing, that two of the three current leaders of the world's superpowers have made the same basic strategic mistake within 5 years of one another - that of assuming an embedded enemy resolved to survive 'no matter what' will capitulate without a fight in the face of aerial bombardment alone. One wonders whether the 3rd leader will take advantage of Trump's current predicament and 'go for the hatrick' by attacking Taiwan....

That said, there is growing support for some form of unversally agreed mechanism for punishing any rogue regime that threatens to hold the world economy to ransom. Sadly, the only way to make this stick may be to obliterate the first regime to do this by nuclear means as an example to any others who might try it. We cannot tolerate the status quo, given our mutual interdependence on trade and common supply chains....

The key message from all this is that the world badly needs to settle down...and quickly, before irreparable damage is done. Sadly, it appears that we cannot necessarily trust our current world leaders to achieve this.

One potential ‘silver lining’ from the chaotic nature of the last 14 months, perhaps, is that it has convinced us all of the risks of allocating ultimate tresponsibility for a natio on one pair of shoulders. Here is some wording for a valuable prescription we might offer the US electorate to consider for their future presidential candidates, which could be included as an amendment to the constitution: 

”..to ensure reliability of key national decision-making, and preserve our democracy, we will place an upper age limit on all presidential candidates…and ensure they submit to an independent psych evaluation before standing for election. This evaluation would be repeated on a regular basis during their terms if elected, and at any other time deemed necessary by elected representatives of the people”. 

Definitely worth considering for the next incumbent, I would suggest (particularly if it's JD Vance!!).

Update 10.4.26: The ceasefire announced at the 11th hour on 8th April seems to be holding, and has avoided wholesale destruction of Iranian civilian infrastructure - for now, at least. However, the prospects for a pasting settlement don't look good. Netanyahu is doing his best to derail things, by hammering away at Hizbollah in Lebanon, although he has now been told to 'tone down' attacks by Trump. Predictably, Iran now believe they have the upper hand and are holding out on opening Hormuz until they get the conditions they want. In reality, this is a deangerous moment - if the Washingtom 'hawks' win the argument, we could yet see a devastating resumption of the war with Trump going for a 'final solution' for the Iranian regime..and where have we heard that phrase before ?

Here's hoping sanity prevails....

First Published 17.3.26; Revised 12.4.26